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[N]othing can be more hurtful to the service, than the neglect of
discipline: for that discipline, more than numbers, gives one
army the superiorityover another.
One weekend a month my ass.2
I. INTRODUCTION'

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent "War on Terrorism" served as an impetus for transformational change throughout the armed
forces of the United States.4 One of those changes was the evolution of the National Guard from a strategic reserve force to an operational force.5 This evolution was necessitated by the military's need for additional manpower in support
of domestic and overseas deployments. 6 The increased operational tempo additionally resulted in an increase in disciplinary and criminal matters within the
National Guard.
Members of the active-duty military are governed by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice ("UCMJ").8 Members of the National Guard are also subject
to the UCMJ when they are serving in a federal military status.9 But when
members of the National Guard serve in their capacity as state military forces
George Washington, General Orders (July 6,

1777),

in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE

WASHINGTON 359 (John C.
2
One
weekend

Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
a
month,
two
weeks
a
year,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oneweekendaamonth,-two weeks-a-year (last visited Oct. 26,
2011). This famous photograph, author unknown, was taken of a U.S. military vehicle in Iraq with
a cardboard sign taped in the window which read, "One weekend a month my ass." Id. The now
infamous quotation was a play on the National Guard's long running slogan "One weekend a
month, two weeks a year," which clearly understated what National Guard service can entail.
The author is an officer and combat veteran serving in the West Virginia Army National
Guard. However, the views expressed in this Note are those of the author alone and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the West Virginia Army National Guard, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
4
See COMM'N ON THE NAT'L GUARD & RESERVES, TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND
RESERVES
INTO
A
21ST-CENTURY
OPERATIONAL
FORCE
(2008),
available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_final-report.pdf.
5
See id. at 5.
6
See id
Maj. Robert L. Martin, Military Justice in the National Guard: A Survey of the Laws and
Proceduresof the States, Territories,and the Districtof Columbia, ARMY L., Dec. 2007, at 30, 51
(citing Colonel Jeffrey Lawson, PowerPoint Presentation at the National Guard Bureau All Hands
Conference in Orlando, Fla.: Model Code & Manual (Jan. 17, 2007) (on file with author)).
8

Id. at 34.

Id.
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they are governed only by state law.' 0 Nearly every state and territory adopted
their own codes of military justice to govern Guardsmen acting in their state
capacity." These state codes differed greatly and some were lacking in jurisdictional standards and extraterritorial provisions.12 The increased operational tempo exacerbated the disparities between state codes and the UCMJ, between the
codes of each state, and served to highlight the need for reform.' 3 As a result,
the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense
to draft a model state code of military justice to be proposed to the states for

adoption.14
West Virginia adopted the Model State Code of Military Justice
("MSC") in the 2010 legislative session.' 5 This Note provides an overview of
the Model State Code of Military Justice and an analysis of areas where there is
likely to be litigation. This Note argues that the MSC (1) properly limited the
right to demand a court-martial in lieu of non-judicial punishment, (2) erred by
adopting a confounding nexus test for establishing jurisdiction, and (3) should
have provided for automatic appellate review of court-martial convictions. Private Joe Snuffy, the military equivalent of John Doe or the Reasonably Prudent
Person, will appear throughout this Note for illustrative value.

10

Id.

1 Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Role of the NationalGuard in NationalDefense and
STATES
THE
UNITED
OF
ASSOCIATION
Homeland Security, NATIONAL GUARD
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000457/primer/20fin.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2011).
12
Martin, supra note 7, at 51.
13
Letter from the National Institute for Military Justice to Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg
at
available
2010),
5,
(Aug.
thehttp://www.wcl.american.edulnimj/documents/NIMJcommentsModelGuardUCMJ.pdfrd=1
reinafter NIMJ Letter].
14
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314,
§ 327(e), 116 Stat. 2458, 2537-2538, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107 congjpublic laws&docid=f:publ314.107.pdf. See also 148 CONG.
REc. H8092 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 2002) (directing the Secretary of Defense to prepare a model state
code of military justice).
15
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-lE-1 to -148 (LexisNexis 2010).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AS A UNIQUE MILITARY FORCE 16

The United States Army is divided into two distinct components: the active component and the reserve component. The reserve component consists of
the United States Army Reserve ("Reserve") and the Army National Guard
("National Guard").' 8 Members of the United States military serving on federal
active-duty are subject to the UCMJ at all times. ' Similarly, members of the
National Guard and Reserve are also subject to the UCMJ while serving on active-duty.20
However, the National Guard is a unique military force that does not
always serve in a federal active-duty status. Article I, Section 8, of the U.S.
Constitution (the "Militia Clause") 21 provides for the existence of the National
Guard as a militia under the control of its respective states and governors, but
"organized, armed, and equipped wholly or partly at Federal expense." 22 Thus,
16
The Military Departments of the United States Department of Defense are the Army, Navy
(of which the Marine Corps is part), and the Air Force. Military Departments, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/orgchart/#3 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011). Those three branches,
plus the Marine Corps itself, all maintain a reserve component. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y
OF DEF. FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES (rev. Sept. 2005),

available
at
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/publications/RC 101%20Handbookupdated%2020%2OSep%2005.pdf. The United States Coast Guard, which falls under the Department of Homeland Security, also maintains a reserve component. Id. See, e.g., Homeland Security,
U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2011). Only the Army and the Air Force maintain National Guard components. OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES

(rev.
Sept.
2005),
available
at
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/publications/RC101%20Handbookupdated%2020%20Sep%2005.pdf. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau directed the state
National Guards to merge their Air and Army commands into joint headquarters in 2003. Memorandum from H. Steven Blum, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Chief, Nat'l Guard Bureau, regarding
Nat'l
Guard
Bureau
Transformation
(July
1,
2003),
available at
http://www.ng.mil/documents/NGB%20Transformation%2ODocuments/ngbtransformationljul03.
pdf. See also id. One survey has shown that, as a result, by 2007, more than 90% of the states
employed military justice systems that were applicable to both the Army and Air Guard. Martin,
supra note 7, at 36. Nevertheless, this Note focuses primarily on the Army National Guard, and,
unless otherwise noted, when used in this article, "National Guard" refers only to the Army National Guard.
17 Organization, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.millinfo/organization/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2011).
1
Id.
19
Martin, supra note 7, at 30 (citing UNIF. CODE OF MIL. JUST. ("UCMJ"), art. 2(a)(1)(2005)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000))); JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MIL. JUST., MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 202(a) discussion (5), R.C.M. 204 (2008 ed.) [herei-

nafter MCM].
20
Martin, supra note 7, at 30 (citing UCMJ, art. 2(a)(1)); MCM, supra note 19, R.C.M. 202(a)
discussion (5), R.C.M. 204.
21
22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16; LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; Martin, supra note 7, at 31.
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being guaranteed by the Constitution and trained with federal funding, state
governors are free to employ the National Guard under their control, at their
expense, and subject to each state's constitutional and statutory provisions.2
Performance in this capacity is commonly referred to as "state active duty" status or "SAD" and includes missions such as disaster relief. 24
In addition, the Militia Clause authorizes the National Guard to act under state control, but in the service of the federal government, in order to "execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Invasions." 25 Federal law further provides that the National Guard can act in this capacity at the
federal expense when approved by the Secretary of Defense.26 Action in this
capacity is commonly referred to as "Title 32 duty status" 27 and includes missions such as guarding airports and critical infrastructure post September 11.
Lastly, the Constitution's War Powers Clause allows the federal government to mobilize (or "federalize") the National Guard into federal service,
under federal control, and at federal expense, in order to provide for the national
defense. 28 Because Title 10 of the United States Code further provides for this
authority, action in this capacity is commonly referred to as "Title 10 duty status."29 This is the status under which National Guard units are deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Thus, at any given time, the National Guard is operating under state active duty status, Title 32 duty status, or Title 10 duty status. But it is only in
Title 10 status that members of the National Guard are subject to the UCMJ. 3 0
At all other times, National Guard members are under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the states. 3 1
III. A PRIMER ON ACTIVE DUTY'S PRE-EXISTING MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

Two realities dictate that a military justice system must exist separate
and distinct from its civilian counterpart. First, military operations-particularly
in combat theaters-cannot come to an abrupt stop for investigators to interview
and crime scene analysts to take photos. What might be called "fundamental
23

LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 2.

24

Id

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15-16.
32 U.S.C. § 902 (2006). See LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 2 and accompanying text for a
discussion on the enactment of 32 U.S.C. § 902 after questions were raised whether the language
of 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), authorizing the National Guard to act under state control but at federal
expense for "training or other duty," sufficiently authorized the use of the National Guard to conduct homeland defense missions post September 11.
27
LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 2.
28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 3.
29
LOWENBERG, supra note 11, at 3.
30
Martin, supra note 7, at 30 (citing 32 U.S.C. §§ 326-327 (2006)).
31
Id
25

26
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notions of justice" in the civilian context are sometimes simply inapplicable.
Second, the dual-purpose nature of the military system requires that it address
the disciplinary measures necessary to an effective military. While the civilian
system results in "criminal" or "not criminal" outcomes, the military system can
effectively result in "not criminal-but punishable."
In an analysis of the military justice system, two competing interests
become apparent. On one hand, instances where a presiding officer acts as judge
and jury run counter to our fundamental notions of justice and present a slippery
slope towards abuses of power. On the other hand, measures taken to combat
those fears can make it impractical-if not impossible-to effectively prosecute
or discipline in the face of military exigencies. This is a tug of war at the heart
of the military justice system.
A.

Putting the Military Justice System in Context

Anecdotally, public perception of the military justice system is based on
one of two sources, or both. The first is that of dashing soldier-lawyers in
starched white uniforms hammering away at justice. Indeed, one popular television show depicted a handsome Judge Advocate General ("JAG") piloting fighter planes-even though he was night blind, even though his flight rating was
likely not current, and as if the military lets lawyers hop in fighter jets at their
leisure.32 Another popular movie portrayed a young Naval Academy-Harvard
Law-JAG taking on the entire military complex.33 While misleading, no one
seems to mind these perceptions.
The second source is different and arises when actual courts-martial 34
reach the public spectacle, a recent example being the Abu Ghraib prison scan-

32
33

Jag (NBC television series 1995-1996, CBS television series 1997-2005).
A FEw GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992).

At several stages of the editing process, debate arose as to the proper the usage of the singular noun, plural noun, and verb form of court-martial. The Oxford English Dictionary lists court
martial as the singular noun, courts martial as the plural noun (court martials as incorrect usage),
and court-martial as the verb. Court Martial, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://oed.com/view/Entry/43250?rskey=gYbvPX&result-1 #eid (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
However, one must be mindful of the quip that the difference between an Englishman and an
American is that the Englishman speaks English. Accordingly, Merriam-Webster lists courtmartial as the singular noun, courts-martial (or court-martials) as the plural noun, and courtmartial
as
the
verb.
Court-martial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/court-martial (last visited Oct. .26, 2011). In truth, the "martial" part of a
court-martial describes the court as having a relation to the military or to war. Thus, it would be
nonsensical to describe one court as having multiple relations to the military (i.e., court-martials).
It makes far more sense to think of them as multiple courts, each having a relation to the military
(courts-martial). In addition, it has been this author's observation of the literature that the common
usage is court-martial as the noun and verb, and courts-martial as the plural. This author ascribes
to the common usage for reasons aforementioned as well as for internal consistency.
34
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dal.3 These cases often depict an "arcane and uninitiated" system lacking in
justice. In response to Abu Ghraib litigation, authors penned articles entitled
Gentlemen Under Fire: The US. Military and "Conduct Unbecoming"37 and A
Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martialand the Failure of the
Military Justice System.
This second source, while based on facts, nonetheless amounts to an
overly simplistic view. The authority for the existence of a separate and distinct
judicial system stems from the Constitution's grant of power to Congress "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
Unlike the civilian system, the military system serves a unique dual purpose: to
promote discipline in addition to justice. 4 0 Thus, the existence of the military
system is one of necessity: the disciplinary requirements of a large number of
troops deployed around the globe demand a system that can sanction the minorto-major gamut of infractions in unique environments. 4 1 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated bluntly, "[t]he need for
national defense mandates an armed force whose discipline and readiness is not
unnecessarily undermined by the often deliberately cumbersome concepts of
civilian jurisprudence. "142
However, the necessity for a different system should not be confused
with being absolved from justice. As the D.C. Circuit continued:
"[T]he dictates of individual liberty clearly require some check
on military authority in the conduct of courts-martial. The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice with respect to
court-martial proceedings represent a congressional attempt to
accommodate the interests of justice, on the one hand, with the

DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-1 (7th
ed. 2008) (citing United States v. Harman, 66 M.J. 710 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2008)).
36
Id.
37
Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and "Conduct Unbecom3

ing ", 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3-6 (2008) (noting that mostly enlistees were prosecuted while few if

any officers were).
38
James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the
Failureof the Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REv. 671 (2006). See generally Ian Kierpaul, The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and Law Students After Abu Ghraib: The Rush to
Bring Private Military Contractorsto Justice, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 407 (2008); John Monroe, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer and Conscious Avoidance Doctrines in the Context of
the Abu GhraibPrison Scandal, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1367 (2006).
39
U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
40

SCHLUETER, supra note 35 (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, pmbl.
(1984 ed.); Report to the Secretary of the Army on the status of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 11-12 (1960)).
41

Id.

42

Id. (quoting Curry v. Sec'y of Army, 595 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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demands for an efficient, well-disciplined military, on the other." 43
Non-JudicialPunishment ("NJP")

B.

In analyzing how the military justice system differs, it should first be
noted that there are two kinds of punishment in the military: judicial and nonjudicial. The latter is the by-law authority of commanders to discipline for minor
infractions without the formalities of a court-martial." Generally speaking, the
amount of punishment that can be proscribed under non-judicial punishment
depends on the relationship in rank between a commander and the subordinate
being punished. 45 Depending on that relationship, commanders may impose
punishments such as suspension from duty, restrictions on duty, correctional
custody for seven to thirty days, forfeiture of seven days' pay to forfeiture of
one-half of monthly pay for two months, and/or a reduction to the next lowest
rank or lowest rank.46 NJP is not a bar from court-martial for offenses stemming
from the same act or omission, but already-imposed NJP may be considered
during court-martial sentencing. 47 Furthermore, a soldier may appeal his NJP to
the next superior authority.4 8 Lastly, before the imposition of punishment, an
accused has the right to demand a trial by court-martial in lieu of the punishment faced under the NJP.49
Types of Courts-Martial

C.

Courts-martial are separate and distinct proceedings. There are three
types of courts-martial under the UCMJ: general courts-martial, special courtsmartial, and summary courts-martial.
1.

General Courts-Martial

A general court-martial may try a person for any offense of military
code or the law of war.5 o It consists of a military judge and jury of at least five
5
members in non-capital cases and twelve members in capital cases. ' A general
court-martial may be convened by commanders designated to do so by the Sec-

4

Id
10 U.S.C.

45

See generally id.

46

§
§
§
§

43

47
48
49
50

51

§ 815 (2006).

815(b).
815(f).
815(e).

815(a).
MCM, supra note 19, R.C.M. 201()(1).
Id. R.C.M. 501(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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retary of their department, by commanders authorized by the President, or by
persons in positions designated in Article 22(a) of the Manual for CourtsMartial.5 2
2.

Special Courts-Martial

A special court-martial may try a person for any offense of military
code, except certain capital offenses, and it cannot impose death, dishonorable
discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than one year, hard labor without
confinement for more than three months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-thirds
pay per month, or any forfeiture of pay for more than one year.53 It may consist
of three members, three members and a military judge, or in certain circumstances, a judge alone.5 4 Special courts-martial are convened by persons authorized to convene general courts-martial, by commanders designated by their
Secretary, or by persons designated in Article 23(a) of the Manual for CourtsMartial."
In the case of both general and special courts-martial, the convening authority may select the members, provided the members are on active duty and
each member is a commissioned officer, a warrant officer (unless the accused is
a commissioned officer), or an enlisted person (if the accused is enlisted and
makes a request pursuant to Rules for Courts-Martial ("R.C.M.") 503(a)(2)).
Also, in both instances, the accused has a right to counsel."
3.

Summary Courts-Martial

A summary court-martial consists of only one commissioned officer
who is charged with making a thorough and impartial inquiry into both sides.58
It may be convened by a commanding officer, a commander's superiors, or anyone who may convene a special or general court-martial.59 The presiding officer
does not have to be an attorney, but may obtain witnesses and evidence 60 and
may consult a legal officer in regard to questions of law. 6 1 The summary pro-

52

Id. R.C.M. 504(b).

53

Id R.C.M. 201(f)(2).

Id R.C.M. 501(a)(2). In order for a special courts-martial to proceed as a bench trial, it must
be requested and approved pursuant to R.C.M. 903. Id. R.C.M. 903.
54

55

Id. R.C.M. 504(b)(2).

56

Id R.C.M. 502.

5

Id. R.C.M. 501(b).
Id. R.C.M. 1301(b).
Id. R.C.M. 1302(a).

ss
5
60
61

Id. R.C.M. 1301(f).
Id. R.C.M. 1301(b).
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ceeding is designed to promptly address minor offenses. 62 Accordingly, the
maximum penalty which a summary court-martial may impose is confinement
for thirty days, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for one month, and reduction to the lowest pay grade.6 3 In addition, the accused in a summary courtmartial has no right to counsel but may be represented by civilian counsel at
their own expense. 6 4 The accused has the right to object to a summary courtmartial and force a special or general-court martial. 65
IV. ESSENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE MODEL STATE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

Harmony Between the MSC and the UCMJ

A.

The MSC looks to the federal UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial
("MCM") as the seminal body of law for military justice. To that extent, the
MSC incorporates the UCMJ and MCM wherever possible and even follows
their format and numbering. Yet the MSC is sensitive towards inherent state
versus federal constitutional issues and seeks to supplement-as opposed to
duplicate-the MCM.6 8
Besides generally mirroring its federal equivalent, the MSC replaces the
various state rules of evidence with the Military Rules of Evidence ("MRE").69
Because National Guard JAGs receive their training from active duty, 70 and
62

Id.

63

Id. R.C.M. 1301(d)(1) discussion.
Id. R.C.M. 1301(e).

64
65

Id. R.C.M. 1303.

Model Code & Manual, PowerPoint Presentation, source unknown (on file with author). See
generally UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2006); MCM, supra note 19; MODEL STATE CODE OF
at
available
(2010),
JUSTICE
MILITARY
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/committees/ArmedForces/PublicDocumen
ts/modelstate-code_20101208132000.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STATE CODE).
67
Model Code & Manual, supra note 66.
66

68

Id. See also MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66 (allowing states to supplement the MSC

where unique state processes are necessary).
69
NIMJ Letter, supra note 13, at 2.
70
The branches of the United States military maintain three Judge Advocate General schools.
The Army maintains The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School in Charlottesville,
Va. THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS U.S. ARMY, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/ (last

visited Oct. 26, 2011). The Navy maintains the Navy Justice School (NJS) in Newport, RI.. U.S.
NAVY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, http://www.jag.navy.mil/njs.htm (last visited Oct. 26,

2011). The NJS trains Marine Corps and Coast Guard JAGs in addition to Navy JAGs. Id. The Air
Force maintains the Air University Law Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, AIR UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13307 (last visited Oct.
26, 2011). Reserve component members attend the JAG school for their active duty component.
Thus, a member of the Army National Guard would attend the U.S. Army's JAG school in Charlottesville while a member of the Marine Corps Reserve would attend the Navy Justice School in
Newport to receive his or her initial JAG training.
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because the MRE mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence, JAGs will be better
able to transition to and from active duty deployments as well as to and from
states. 7 1 Moreover, states will generally be better equipped by having a developed body of military law from which to draw upon. 2
Critics have argued that the MSC is unhelpful since National Guard
JAGs are already familiar with the laws and procedures of their states. While it
is true they are familiar, it is not true that the MSC is unhelpful. While each
JAG is familiar with his or her state, nearly all JAGs should be familiar with
federal procedure; in addition, every JAG should be familiar with the UCMJ,
both from training and deployments. Thus, the benefit of uniformity goes to
portability and not necessarily knowledge of one body of law over the other.
B.

24/7 Applicability and Extraterritoriality

Both reserve and active-duty personnel are subject to the UCMJ by virtue of being on Title 10 status at the time an offense is committed.74 Under most
states' military codes, members of the National Guard were only subject to military justice while serving on Title 32 or State Active Duty.75 When not serving
under Title 10, Title 32, or State Active Duty (in other words, during their civilian lives), members of the National Guard were only subject to the civil laws of
their state and of the federal government.
In contrast, the MSC extends personal jurisdiction to apply to all members of the National Guard at all times.76
Private Joe Snuffy, a member of the West Virginia National
Guard, is visitingfriends in Morgantown, West Virginia,for a
weekend of generally nefarious behavior.Private Snuffy decides
to sleigh ride down a steep hillside next to Mountaineer Field,
despite large signs stating that sleigh riding is prohibited.Being the soldier that he is, Private Snuffy decides that sleigh riding is boring and endeavors to discover whether his truck
amounts to a good substitutefor his sleigh.

71

NIMJ Letter, supra note 13, at 2-3.

72

Id.
Id. at 3.

7

Martin, supra note 7, at 38.
7
Id. "In most states, the military status of the National Guard Soldier (serving in a Title 32 or
state active duty status) is the key component of jurisdiction for military justice action." Id The
author further noted that nearly half of the states require that a National Guard member be in a
duty status. Id States that do not adhere to this rule typically resemble the UCMJ; that is, in those
states members are already subject to their military code at all times by virtue of being in the
National Guard. Id.
76
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 2(a).
74
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Assuming arguendo that subject matter jurisdiction existed under the
MSC, Private Snuffy's actions could result in prosecution pursuant to West Virginia civil law or court-martial pursuant the MSC.
Moreover, in addition to applying at all times, the MSC applies in all
places." This provision on extraterritoriality requires that a person is in a duty
status, or if he is not, that a nexus exists between the offense and the state mili78
tary force. In either instance, the MSC does not preclude nor limit civilian
jurisdiction until double jeopardy attaches.79 Thus, under the MSC, a member of
the West Virginia National Guard serving on border patrol duty in New Mexico
on Title 32 orders would be subject to both the civil law of New Mexico and
West Virginia's military justice system.
Mechanics of ConcurrentJurisdiction

C.

Because the MSC applies to all National Guard members at all times, it
will often be the case that both civil courts and military courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a Guardsman.o80 The MSC attempts to head off any such conflicts. In the case of military offenses as defined in the code, courts-martial have
primary jurisdiction. 1 In the case of offenses that violate both civil law (foreign
or domestic) and the MSC, civilian courts have primary jurisdiction. 82 The military justice system still has jurisdiction, it simply cannot initiate a court-martial
until and unless the civilian authorities decline to prosecute or dismiss the
charge.83 A court-martial is only thereafter prohibited if jeopardy has attached.8 4
D.

Non-Judicial Punishment

Under the UCMJ, active duty personnel have the right to demand a trial
by court-martial in lieu of an NJP proceeding.85 The MSC declines to extend
this right in all instances; instead, the MSC provides that commanders must predetermine whether arrest or confinement will be considered as punishments.86 If
arrest or confinement will be considered, then the accused has the right to demand a court-martial in lieu of NJP and must be informed of his or her right; if

n

Id. art. 5(a).

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. art. 2(a).
Id. art. 2(b).

81
82

Id.

83

Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 2(b).
10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (2006).
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 15(f).

84

85
86
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arrest and confinement will not be considered, then the accused must be informed that he or she has no right to demand a court-martial.87
While there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that the accused in an NJP proceeding must have the right to demand a court-martial, the
MSC's approach nevertheless attempts to avoid restraint of liberty issues on one
hand, but provide commanders with the effective tool of NJP on the other.88
That is, under the various state codes, soldiers knew that they could escape an
NJP by demanding a court-martial since states were ill-equipped to conduct
courts-martial; by not extending the right to demand to cases where there will be
no restraint of liberty, the MSC makes NJP proceedings relevant once more.89
For a more detailed discussion on the MSC and NJPs and courts-martial, see
infra this Note Part V, Section A.
V. WHERE THE MODEL STATE CODE GETS IT RIGHT, GETS IT WRONG, AND
WHERE IT COULD DO BETTER

Being in the army is like being in the Boy Scouts, except that the
Boy Scouts have adult supervision.90
A.

The Right to Demand a Court-Martialin Lieu ofNJP
Private Joe Snuffy's girlfriend is quite the catch. His buddies
have no idea how he managed to land such a babe. They can
only imagine: "It must be the uniform. " Snuffy's commander is
acquaintedwith Snuffy's girlfriend. The commanderalways had
a thingfor Snuffy's girlfriendand recentlyflirtation has evolved
into Facebook stalking. Girlfriend,however, is only attractedto
"rugged" enlisted types who work for a living and has rebuffed
all of the commander's advances. One weekend, Private Snuffy
shows up five minutes late to drill because his car had a flat
tire. Commander takes the rather extreme measure of nonjudiciallypunishingPrivate Snuffy.

The MSC, being modeled after the UCMJ, is substantially similar with
respect to NJP proceedings and courts-martial, although punishments are adjusted to suit the one-weekend-a-month nature of the National Guard. 91However, one important difference is the mechanics of demanding a court-martial in
lieu of an NJP. Under the MSC, a commanding office determines, prior to the

89

Id
Id. at ann. to art.
Id

90

ROBERT BYRNE, THE

87
88

15.

2,548 BEST

THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID

884 (2002) (quoting Ameri-

can stand-up comedian and Vietnam veteran Blake Clark).
91
See generally MODEL STATE CODE, supranote 66, art. 15.
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offer of an NJP, whether arrest in quarters or restriction will be considered as
punishments.92 If they are, the accused must be informed of his right to demand
a court-martial; if arrest or restriction will not be considered, the accused must
be informed that there is no right to demand a trial by courts-martial. 93 The accused will still maintain the right to appeal the NJP to the next superior authori94
ty.
The differing codes of military justice that had governed-and in many
cases still govern-the National Guards of the fifty-four states, territories, and
District of Columbia were divided between those that provided the right to demand a court-martial d la the UCMJ and those that provided the accused with no
statutory rights. 95 The Military Justice Working Group's notes to the MSC's
NJP provisions explain two debates surrounding the restriction.
Section I addresses the first debate: the right to counsel in a nonjudicial proceeding.9 6 In turn, section 2 addresses the second debate: an accused's right to demand an NJP and proceed to a court-martial. The interplay
between right to counsel and right to demand a court-martial has the potential
for serious consequences: If a soldier has no right to counsel in an NJP, and if a
soldier has no right to demand a court-martial, then the soldier facing NJP is
precluded from ever arriving at a forum where the soldier is afforded counsel.
Lastly, a threshold matter must be addressed. NJP and summary courtsmartial are similar in the sense that both are administrative in nature. This is in
contrast to special courts-martial and general courts-martial, which are similar in
the sense that both are criminal in nature. This distinction is addressed in greater
detail infra. For now, it is only important to note that the analysis of right to
counsel in NJP proceedings draws upon the analysis of right to counsel in summary courts-martial because that is where the bulk of the case law lies.
The Right to Counsel in NJP Proceedings

1.

In Middendorf v. Henry, United States Marines brought a class action
challenging the military's authority to try them at summary courts-martial without providing counsel. 97 Five Marines had been charged with unauthorized ab92

Id. art. 15(f).

9

Id.

94

Id. art. 15(h).
Id. at ann. to art. 15. For example, statutes providing a right to court martial included ARIz.

9
REV. STAT. ANN.

§

26-1015 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20,

§

163 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN.

§

46-1107 (2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29B.14 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2301 (2011); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:115 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 192A.085 (West 2011). States that provided the accused with no statutory right included ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-64-301 (2011); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 250.35 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-360 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 124A21 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32.1015 (West 2011).
96

See supra note 95.

97

425 U.S. 25, 28 (1976).
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sences, convicted by summary courts-martial, and sentenced to twenty to thirty
days confinement and hard labor.98 Two other Marines were charged with unauthorized absences and one with assault, but their summary courts-martial had
not yet convened.99
All of the plaintiffs had been informed that counsel would not be provided, and that they could refuse summary court-martial; however,- all of the
plaintiffs consented in writing to proceed without counsel. 00 The district court
in Middendorfexpunged all of the plaintiffs' convictions, released all members
of the plaintiffs' class, and issued a worldwide injunction prohibiting summary
courts-martial from proceeding without counsel.' 0 '
a.

The Gagnon Rule

The appellate court vacated and remanded Middendorf in light of two
cases: Gagnon v. Scarpelli'02 and Daigle v. Warner.0 3 In Gagnon, the United
States Supreme Court held that the State was not required to provide counsel in
all probationary hearings 04 because the revocation of parole is not a criminal
prosecution.' 05 However, in light of due process considerations, the Gagnon
Court did require counsel in probationary hearings where the "accused makes a
request based on a timely and colorable claim (1) that he has a defense, or (2)
that there are mitigating circumstances, and the assistance of counsel is necessary in order adequately to present the defense or mitigating circumstances.',106
Shortly after the Gagnon decision, the same appellate court that would
later hear Middendorf created an exception to the Gagnon rule in Daigle.107
Daigle revolved around military defendants who were convicted of summary
courts-martial without being afforded counsel. 0 8 The Daigle court held that
there was (1) no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in summary courtsmartial, 09 and (2) no absolute Fifth Amendment due process right to counsel in
every case in which a military defendant might be imprisoned." 10

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id

to1

Id. at 30.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
440 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1973).

102
103

104

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787.

1os

Id. at 789-90.
Middendorf,425 U.S. at 30-31.
Daigle, 490 F.2d 358.

106
107

109

Id. at 359.
Id. at 359-60.

110

Id. at 360.

108
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Nevertheless, in light of due process concerns, the Daigle court also
adopted the Gagnon rule, but with one important exception: even when an accused makes a timely request and colorable claim, "if, due to the exigencies of
military operations, qualified counsel is not reasonably available, the military
may nevertheless proceed if the rights of the accused will not be unduly prejudiced.""' Thus, Daigle created a "not reasonably available" exception to Gagnon's rule. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Middendorfto
resolve the dispute." 2
b.

The Gagnon Rule Overruled

Turning back to Middendorf, the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that court-martial right to counsel had been much debated and
never resolved," 3 but after summarizing opposing authorities, the Court cast
aside any Sixth Amendment debate by holding that summary courts-martial are
not the type of "criminal prosecution" contemplated by the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel in criminal prosecutions.114
The Sixth Amendment debate focused on two cases: Argersinger v.
Hamlin"s and Gagnon."6 Argersinger held that the Sixth Amendment's provision for assistance to counsel extended to misdemeanor prosecutions in civilian
courts: "[N]o person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."'' 7

III
112

Id. at 365.
Id. at 31.

"
See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (stating in dicta that "the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth"); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40
(1942) ("[C]ases arising in the land or naval forces are . . . expressly excepted from the Fifth
Amendment, and are deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth.") (internal citations omit-

ted). Compare Frederick Bemays Wiener, Courts-Martialand the Bill of Rights: The Original

Practice1, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1958) (arguing that there is no historical precedent for application
of the right to counsel to courts-martial), with Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martialand The
Constitution: The Original Understanding,71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957) (arguing that the Fra-

mers' intent was to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the military). CompareDaigle,
490 F.2d at 358, with Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001, 1008 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that both
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require counsel in any court-martial proceeding which result in
imprisonment).
114 Middendorf,425 U.S. at 34. See also id. at 34, n.13 (reasoning that were the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied to summary courts-martial than the right to jury trial would have to
be applied as well); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (establishing maximum sentences
that can be imposed without a jury).
"

407 U.S. 25 (1972).

"

411 U.S. 778 (1973).
Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.

"1
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Gagnon had escaped Argersinger's Sixth Amendment holding by drawing the distinction between "criminal proceedings" and other actions such as
probationary hearings, parole boards, and juvenile proceedings.' 18 Juvenile proceedings had been directly addressed by the Court in an earlier case, In re Gault.
While the Gault Court ultimately held that due process considerations required
counsel, the Court took pains to distance its holding from the Sixth Amendment:
"We do not mean. .. to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with
all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative
hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of
due process and fair treatment."' 19
The Middendorf Court pointed to three factors which made summary
courts-martial more similar to Gagnon's and Gault's non-criminal proceedings
for Sixth Amendment purposes. First, summary courts-martial take place in a
tightly regimented military community that is dissimilar from its civilian counterpart.120 Second, the penalties which may result from summary courts-martial
were limited to one month's confinement at hard labor.121 Third, summary
courts-martial are procedurally nothing like a criminal trial.122 It was those factors combined which led the MiddendorfCourt to its conclusion that Argersinger 's Sixth Amendment holding was inapplicable to summary courts-martial.123
The summary court-martial is . .. one of four types of proceed-

ings by which the military imposes discipline or punishment. If
we were to remove the holding of Argersinger from its civilian
context and apply it to require counsel before a summary courtmartial proceeding simply because loss of liberty may result
from such a proceeding, it would seem all but inescapable that
counsel would likewise be required for the lowest level of military proceeding for dealing with the most minor offenses. For
even the so-called Art. 15 "nonjudicial punishment," which may
be imposed administratively by the commanding officer, may
result in the imposition upon an enlisted man of "correction custody" with hard labor for not more than 30 consecutive days.
But we think that the analysis made in cases such as Gagnon
and Gault, as well as considerations peculiar to the military,

Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 788-89.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (quoting Kent v. United States, 303 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)).
120
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 38 (1976).
121
Id. at 40.
122
Id. at 40-41.
123
Id. at 42.
118

119
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counsel against such a mechanical application of Argersinger.124
With the Sixth Amendment debate dispensed with, the Supreme Court
in Middendorf turned to the Gagnon rule which, out of Fifth Amendment due
process concerns, nonetheless required counsel in some instances. While members of the military are guaranteed due process by the Fifth Amendment,
"whether [due process] embodies a right to counsel depends upon an analysis of
the interests of the individual and those of the regime to which he is subject." 1 25
The Middendorf Court concluded that three factors tipped the scales
against a due process right to counsel. First, Congress must be accorded particular deference because the Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate
the land and naval forces. 126 Second, the presence of counsel at summary courtsmartial would defeat the very purpose of summary courts-martial by transforming their nature from brief and informal to burdensome and attenuated.127 Third,
the accused in a summary court-martial may refuse such trial and proceed to
trial by special court-martial at which the accused will receive counsel. For
those reasons, the MiddendorfCourt held any application of Gagnon or Daigle
inapplicable to summary courts-martial: "[N]either the Sixth nor Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution empowers us to overturn the congressional determination that counsel is not required in summary courts-martial." 29
c.

Right to Counsel Under the MSC and the West Virginia
Uniform State Code of Military Justice

Both the MSC and the West Virginia Uniform State Code of Military
Justice ("WVUSCMJ") are silent with regard to the right to counsel in NJP proceedings, but the drafters of the MSC addressed the issue in annotation:
Whether an accused has a constitutional right to counsel in a proceeding under
article 15 was addressed in Middendorf v. Henry .

. .

. Pursuant to case law,

there is no constitutional right to counsel in an Article 15 proceeding or a summary court-martial under either the 5th, 6th, or 14th amendments.1 30
Id. at 36-37 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 43 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
126
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. This grant of authority to Congress is also important in the context
of military subject matter jurisdiction. For a detailed discussion see infra notes 152-154, 169-174
and accompanying text.
127
Middendorf 425 U.S. at 45.
128
Id. at 46-47.
129
Id. at 48.
130
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15 (citing Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S.
25 (1976); United States v. Booker, 5 M.J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Alsup, 17 M.J.
166 (C.M.A. 1984)).
124
125
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To many observers, the MiddendorfCourt's reasoning may seem dubious in the
civilian context; after all, the distinction between criminal and non-criminal
makes little difference to the imprisoned.131 But the distinction makes more
sense-perhaps the only sense-in the military context.
Unlike in the civilian system, some minor loss of liberty without counsel is acceptable in the military system precisely because of the military system's dual purpose of justice and discipline.' 3 2 NJP's and summary courtsmartial more closely resemble administrative discipline than criminal proceedings. Because the importance of a disciplined military has been recognized by
everyone from the Romans to our contemporary courts, 133 and because the very
purpose of NJP and summary courts-martial is to effect discipline, the military
distinction between criminal and non-criminal is both logical and imperative.
Nevertheless, there is one caveat. While the UCMJ's discussion notes
state that "[n]either the Constitution nor any statute establishes any right to
counsel at summary courts-martial," 34 the UCMJ rule also provides that counsel may appear at the detailing authority's discretion. 13' Thus, despite having no
right to counsel, the detailing authority of a summary court-martial may, at his
discretion, make available a military attorney to represent the accused. Indeed,
the common practice is that the accused will be allowed counsel in both NJP
proceedings and summary court-martial.136 In addition, if counsel is allowed, the
accused may elect to retain civilian counsel instead, at the accused's own ex-

pense.137
The drafters of the MSC explicitly recognized that common practice
under the UCMJ is to allow counsel but explained that "[t]he codification of this
A number of cases post-Gault have alluded to the distinction being more fiction than fact.
John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016,
1018 (1st Cir. 1991); Reed v. Duter, 416 F.2d 744, 749 (7th Cir. 1969) ("Gault must be construed
as incorporating in juvenile court procedures, which may lead to deprivation of liberty . . . the
constitutional safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.") Id. at 749.
132
A second and complementary component is that military members' liberty is already restricted in many ways. Thus, for a military member to suffer a loss of liberty without counsel is a
much shorter step than for a civilian to suffer a loss of liberty without counsel.
133
See generally SCHLUETER, supra note 35.
134
MCM, supra note 19, R.C.M. 1301(e) discussion.
131

135

Id.

MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15. See also AFI 51-202, § 3.12.2 (2003),
available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/medialepubs/AFI51-202.pdf (noting that the
accused has a right to consult counsel and that commanders should encourage the accused to do
so); AR 27-10, § 3-18(c) (2005), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf (requiring commanders to notify soldiers of a right to consult counsel prior to NJP proceedings).
13
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15. Note that if the common practice is to
allow counsel at NJP's and summary courts-martial, then an inference may be drawn that the
presence of counsel is not as burdensome as the Middendorf Court claimed. See Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976). A better argument is not that the presence counsel is necessarily burdensome, but simply that military operations couldpreclude the availability of counsel.
136
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right cannot be practically fulfilled by any state's current judge advocate manpower allocation."" 8 While the lack of manpower is doubtlessly true, the justification is nonetheless curious. Because an accused has no right to counsel in the
first place, no harm would result if the MSC provided a permissive grant of
counsel despite an inability to necessarily provide judge advocates. In addition,
if a permissive grant existed but no JAGs were available, an accused would still
retain the option of hiring civilian counsel at the accused's own expense. 139
In review, the MSC's denial of counsel in NJP proceedings and summary courts-martial is well-grounded in both case law and logic. But the MSC's
omission of a permissive grant of counsel is unfortunate since, arguably, a lack
of counsel creates the perception that justice is a foregone conclusion. Thus,
while the right to counsel must give way to military exigencies, there is little
reason to deny an accused a permissive grant of counsel when no such exigencies exist. The law aside, one might wonder whether the active-duty permissive
grant of counsel rests on better-grounded principles. Some state legislatures may
wisely choose to deviate from the MSC in this respect; if they do not, it remains
an open question whether Adjutant Generals can or will allow a permissive
grant of counsel by affording their soldiers greater rights pursuant to regulation.
2.

The Right to Demand a Court-Martial in Lieu of an NJP Proceeding

The second debate, which surrounded the MSC's provisions on NJP,
was whether the accused had a right to demand a court-martial in lieu of an NJP,
which could result in his confinement. 140 The UCMJ provides soldiers with the
right to refuse an NJP and take their case to trial by court-martial.141 It further
provides that accused persons can object to a summary court-martial, forcing a

138
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15. One question that arises is why the
National Guard must necessarily rely on JAGs. States could seek to gain the support of state and
federal public defenders' offices. Anecdotally, those offices tend to have attorneys with previous
military-and even JAG-experience. Alternatively, states could reach out to members of their
civilian bar who have military experience.
13
Being silent on the right to counsel generally, it follows that the MSC is also silent on employing civilian counsel. Nevertheless, because the MSC is substantially based on the UCMJ, and
because R.C.M. 1301(e) expressly allows the accused to obtain civilian counsel during summary
courts-martial, it follows that it would be proper for the MSC to allow civilian counsel in the
context of NJP proceedings and summary courts-martial. MCM, supra note 19, R.C.M. 1301(e).
A civilian counsel appearing before a summary court-martial under the UCMJ must be qualified
pursuant to R.C.M. 502(d)(3), similar to the concept of being admitted pro hac vice. Id. See also
id. R.C.M. 502(d)(3).
140
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15.
141
UCMJ, art. 15 § 815. One example of the necessity for the military system to adapt to
unique exigencies is that the right to demand a court-martial in lieu of NJP is not extended to
members of the military while at-sea. Id.
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jury trial by special or general court-martial. 14 2 The rule explicitly applies even
in circumstances where the summary court-martial stemmed from an objection
to an NJP proceeding.143 Thus, in the active-duty context, an accused facing NJP
may object and proceed to court-martial. If the resulting action is a summary
court-martial, the accused may object again and arrive at a trial-by-jury special
or general court-martial in which the accused will also have a right to appointed
counsel.
In contrast, the MSC requires that if a commanding officer predetermines that imprisonment will be considered as a punishment to an NJP proceeding, then the accused must be informed of his right to demand a court-martial.'44
Conversely, if the commanding officer predetermines that imprisonment will
not be considered, then the accused must be informed that he has no right to
demand a court-martial.1 45 Taken together, under the MSC an accused who is
not facing imprisonment: (1) has the right to appeal the outcome of an NJP proceeding to the next higher authority; but (2) is not afforded counsel (neither by
right nor by permission); and (3) can never reach a trial by jury where he or she
would have a right to counsel because the accused has no right to demand a
court-martial.
The drafters of the MSC explained:
One of the failings of state nonjudicial punishment (NJP) statutes in the past has been the right to demand court-martial,
which every accused knew would likely never happen because
of the time, expense, and burden of conducting a military court.
This effectively did away with NJP as an option for unit commanders. Taking away the right of this NJP "turn down" and the
right to demand a court-martial in lieu of NJP in most cases allows the commander to utilize the disciplinary tool of the NJP
while protecting the accused and avoiding restraint of liberty is-

sues.146
As the drafters continued, "[b]ecause restraints on liberty drive due
process considerations," the MSC created a bifurcated procedure that empowers
commanders on one hand, but on the other hand allows an accused to proceed to
court-martial when his liberty is at stake.1 47 While this approach appears valid,
when juxtaposed with the drafters' reasoning for being silent on the right to
MCM, supra note 19, R.C.M. 1303. See also id. at R.C.M. 401 (providing for how a convening authority may dispose of an objected-to summary court-martial).
143
Id. R.C.M. 1303.
'4
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 15(f).
I45 Id.
146
Id. at ann. to art. 15.
142

147

id
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counsel, the question arises whether the bifurcated approach was necessary at
all. Hence, the drafters relied on Middendorfs distinction between "criminal
proceedings" and NJP proceedings and summary courts-martial to absolve the
MSC from due process considerations in the context of counsel, but then cited
due process considerations for creating a bifurcated right to demand a courtmartial in lieu of an NJP proceeding.1 48 If Middendorfstands for the proposition
that NJP proceedings and summary courts-martial amount to non-criminal proceedings for the purposes of due process considerations, then it stands to follow
that there are also no due process considerations of the right to demand a courtmartial in lieu of NJP.
One hypothesis would be that the Military Justice Working Group simply declined to discover the extent to which the courts would allow the military
justice system to afford lesser rights. Alternatively, the drafters may have had
other considerations than those stated. That is, this may simply be a situation
notions of justice.
our fundamental
counter to
which runs
Denying a right to demand a court-martial when liberty is not at stake is one
thing, but imprisonment solely by a commander's hand is another. Furthermore,
if liberty is at stake, and the accused declines to demand a court-martial, then
presumably the accused either expects to receive a fair hearing or expects to be
found guilty regardless of the forum.
Legal analysis aside, practical considerations call into the question the
necessity of the MSC's bifurcated approach. The Military Justice Working
Group reasoned that NJPs were useless under the old models because soldiers
recognized that they could escape punishment by demanding a court-martial
since time, expense, and burden made National Guard courts-martial tantamount
to bluffing. 149 However, the MSC appears to envision states lessening the burden of conducting courts-martial by pooling resources.150 Military judges and
defense counsel may be brought in from other states and admitted pro hac
vice. '5 Purportedly, this will have the secondary effect of increasing the appearance of an independent judiciary.'
Hence, if the MSC is successful in easing the burdens of conducting
courts-martial, then court-martial will no longer be a bold-faced threat. Because
a court-martial may be considered a federal conviction, and because courtmartial may result in precluding a soldier from benefits and employment opportunities, once the threat of court-martial is real, soldiers will have to think long
and hard before opting out of NJP.153
Id. See also Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1976); U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
149
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, at ann. to art. 15.
Iso
See generally id. art. 26-27 and ann. to art. 26.
'
Id art. 26-27.
152
Id. at ann. to art. 26.
s3 Non-Judicial Punishment, JAG DEFENSE, http://www.jagdefense.com/nonjudicialpunishment.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
148
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The WVUSCMJ adopted the MSC's bifurcated approach, representing a
substantial departure from West Virginia's prior code.154 Regardless of whether
the bifurcated approach was based on legal grounds, practicality, or principle, its
utility will hinge on whether the MSC successfully drives courts-martial. That
is, if National Guard courts-martial proliferate, then the threat of court-martial
will not be empty and the need for the bifurcated approach will disappear. In the
mean time, commanders in the West Virginia National Guard will finally be
able to utilize the disciplinary tool of NJP.
B.

Subject MatterJurisdictionof the MSC and WVUSCMJ
The date was December 27, 1777. Private Joseph Martin Snufa member of the Virginia militia, sat with haggardrebels
and watched the snow fall upon their Valley Forge encampment. Being the summer soldier and sunshine patriot that he
was, Private Snuffy took off for Tidewater. He stopped for a
drink in Dover at Calvert's Tavern-a good Protestant bar
where the ales were stout and the women stouter still. Suspecting anotherpatron to be a tortious Tory, Snuffy bludgeoned the
fellow bloodily. Quaere, whether a sufficient nexus existed between Snuffy 's assault and the Virginia militiafor Snuffy to be
court-martialed15 5

fy,

The WVUSCMJ provides that it "applies to all members of the state
military forces at all times." 1 6 This grant of jurisdiction is a substantial deviation from the prior code, which was only applicable to soldiers when they were
acting in their capacity as Guardsmen.157 The WVUSCMJ further provides that
subject matter jurisdiction is established if "a nexus exists between an offense,
either military or nonmilitary, and the state military force."158 This latter provision is identical to its counterpart in the MSC.159
The Military Justice Working Group's notes to the model article reason
that "a member of the state military forces is under obligation of oath, and therefore, under the jurisdiction of the state during a period of service regardless of
whether they are in a duty status."o60 In support of its argument for extending
Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-1E-16 (LexisNexis 2010), with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 151E-16 (West 2002).
15
This tale is not so tall. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
156
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-1E-2(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
'5
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-lE-3 (West 2002). The exact language simply reads, "This
article applies to all members of the state military force who are not in federal service." Id.
58
W. VA. CODE ANN. §l5-1E-2(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
154

159

MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 2.

160

Id. at ann. to art. 2.
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jurisdiction, the Military Justice Working Group cited Solorio v. United
States.'6 ' This grant of jurisdiction has been called into question by the National
Institute for Military Justice because of the complexity of the nexus test analysis.1 6 2 As discussed infra, additional reasons call into the question the MSC's
adoption of the nexus test.
1.

The Rise of the Nexus Test

O'Callahan v. Parker was a 1969 case in which a United States Army
Sergeant was stationed on active-duty in Hawaii. 163 While on pass,164 the sergeant broke into a hotel room, assaulted, and attempted to rape a young woman.1 6 5 The sergeant was turned over to the military authorities, court-martialed,
and convicted on all counts. 6 6
After being imprisoned, the sergeant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the military courts were without jurisdiction to try him for
nonmilitary offenses committed off-post, while on pass.'6 ' The district court
denied the writ without reaching the merits, the Third Circuit affirmed, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer one question:
Does a court-martial, held under the Articles of War, Tit. 10,
U.S.C. § 801 et seq., have jurisdiction to try a member of the
Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable in a civilian court and having no military significance,
alleged to have been committed off-post and while on leave,
thus depriving him of his constitutional rights to indictment by
a grand jury and trial by a petit jury in a civilian court? 6 1
The prosecution cited a line of cases which outlined persons who could
not be subject to a court-martial 69 to support its argument that the validity of
161

162

Id.(citing Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987)).
NIMJ Letter, supra note 13, at 4.

395 U.S. 258, 259 (1969).
164
"Pass" is military lingo for an authorized absence that does not count against one's accrued
leave. Passes can be granted to individuals or entire units for up to ninety-six hours at the commanders discretion; the granting of passes is common and often in conjunction with federal holidays or at the end of major training events where soldiers have been away from their families.
165
O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 259-60.
166
Id. at 260-61.
167
Id. at 261.
163

168

Id.

See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (holding that discharged soldiers cannot be court-martialed for offenses committed while they were a member of the armed
forces); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (holding that civilian employees of the
military who are stationed overseas cannot be court-martialed); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
169
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military jurisdiction rests solely on the person's "status" as a member of the
"land and naval forces."'n0 The O'CallahanCourt recognized the Constitution's
grant of power to Congress to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces" as approval of a special system of courts better
equipped to deal with the exigencies that military discipline requires. 171 But the
Court rejected the logic of the prosecution's "status" test. "'Status' is necessary
for jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes
the inquiry, regardless of the nature, time, and place of the offense."l 7 2 Thus, in
the O'CallahanCourt's view, status represented the beginning of the inquiry,
not the end.
Indeed, the lesser-afforded rights of defendants in a court-martial proceeding led to abuses of the system in England and was one of the grievances of
American Colonists.1 73 Abuses notwithstanding, some authorities contend that
by the time of the American Revolution, the rule in the British military was that
"military officers were required to use their energies and office to insure that the
accused soldier would be tried before a civil court."1 74 In short, the Court reasoned that because courts-martial afford fewer rights, they tempt abuse, and
because they tempt abuse, their use should be limited. For those reasons, the
Court concluded that military jurisdiction must be predicated on a serviceconnection. 175
The facts of O'Callahan strongly indicated there was no serviceconnection. The sergeant was properly absent from his military base and duties.' 7 6 The crime was committed at a hotel in Waikiki (as opposed to military
property or a foreign occupied zone). 7 7 Civilian courts were available; the
crime was not connected to the sergeant's military duties, and the defendant was
not connected to the military in any way. 78 Because there was no serviceconnection, the Court held that the sergeant was entitled to trial by the civilian
courts. 179

(1971) (same as McElroy); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (holding that civilian dependents accompanying military personnel overseas cannot be court-martialed).
170
O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 267 (citing Kinsella, 361 U.S. 234).
171 Id. at 261 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
172
17
174

Id. at 267.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 27-29. See also id. at 28 n.49 (1957).
O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 269 (citing W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND

PRECEDENTS 1448,

1456 (2d ed. 1896, 1920 reprint).
'
Id. at 272.
176
Id. at 259-60.
177

Id

178

Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.

17
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The Death of the Nexus Test

The Military Justice Working Group, in support of its argument for extending jurisdiction under the MSC, cited Solorio v. United States, a 1987 United States Supreme Court case. 180 In that case, an active duty member of the
Coast Guard sexually abused the two daughters of a fellow coastguardsman.' 8 1
The offenses were committed in the fellow coastguardsman's private residence
in the community of Juneau, Alaska.18 2 The commission of the offenses was not
discovered until the defendant had been transferred posts to Governors Island,
New York.' 8 1
Thereafter, a general court-martial was convened in New York and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The general court-martial's holding was
based on two cases: O'Callahanand Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary
Barracks.184 The Court of Military Review reversed the holding of the courtmartial. On further appeal, the United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed
the finding of jurisdiction, reasoning that because the sex offenses against young
children had a continuing effect on the victims and their families, and because
that effect would extend to the detrimental morale of any military organization,
the offenses were within the meaning of O'Callahanand Relford' s nexus test.'
The Court of Military Appeals cited three additional factors justifying
jurisdiction, including: (1) the interest of Alaskan civilian officials in prosecuting the accused; (2) the hardship on the victims (who had since moved from
Alaska) that would result if they had to appear in both civilian proceedings in
Alaska as well as a military proceeding in New York; and (3) the benefits to
petitioner-Coast Guard from trying the cases together.18 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. But
instead of straining to reason the facts of Solorio into O'Callahan'snexus test,
the Court took the opportunity to explicitly overturn O'Callahan.8 7
First, the Solorio Court pointed to "an unbroken line of cases from 1866
to 1960" which held that proper court-martial jurisdiction hinged "on one factor:
180

483 U.S. 435 (1987).

181

Id. at 436.

182

Id. at 436-37.

Id. at 437.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary
Barracks, 401 U.S. 355, 369 (1971) (holding that offenses committed by a service member "within or at the geographical boundary of a military" installation against individuals or their property
were within O'Callahan's service connection test). In Relford, a service member sexually assaulted two non-service members on a military installation and claimed that the crimes were not
connected to his duties as a service member. Id. at 361-364. The necessity for further elucidation
of the service connection test only foreshadowed its difficulties. See infra notes 200-204.
185
United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 251, 255-57 (1986).
186
Id. at 257-58.
183

184

187

Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 440-42 (1987).
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the military status of the accused.""' Throughout that line of cases it was continually held that the natural meaning of Article I, Section 8, clause 14 and the
Fifth Amendment's exception for cases arising in the land or naval forces was
"one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a
can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval
person who
89

Forces."'l

Second, case law aside, the Court reasoned that Congress' Clause 14
power to make rules for the "'Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces' must certainly include the power to regulate the conduct of persons
actually serving in the military.' 90 This, the Court continued, was the Framers'
real intent.' 9' Because the Framers feared an Executive exercising unchecked
military authority, the Framers explicitly authorized the Congress to regulate the
armed forces-but there is no evidence that the Framers intended to limit the
scope of Congress's authority in that regard.192 As Alexander Hamilton explained, "'[t]hese powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them."'l9

Third, the Solorio Court cast doubt on the historical analysis of British
and early American law upon which the O'Callahanholding relied. While the
British Articles of War of 1774 contained language deferring offenses against
person or property to civil courts, other sections of the Articles provided for
courts-martial if a soldier destroyed the property of a citizen. 194 In addition, the
American Articles of War of 1776 were substantially based on the British Articles and contained a provision requiring commanders to turn soldiers over to

Id. at 439 (citing Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opinion); Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23
(1957) (plurality opinion); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre,
158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1886); Exparte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2 (1866); cf United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1921); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1921)).
189 Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 240-41 (1960); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress the authority to regulate the Armed Forces); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
190
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 441 (1987) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
191 Id. See also O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 277 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting) (noting that art. I, §
8, cl. 14 was adapted from art. 9, § 4 of the Articles of Confederation, which expressed the Framers' fear of executive abuse via the armed forces by granting Congress the "sole and exclusive
right and power" to govern and regulate the land and naval forces).
192
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 441. See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (Harlan, J.
dissenting); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
'93
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 441 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), at 152-54
(E. Bourne ed., 1947)).
194 Id. at 443 (citing BRITISH ARTICLES OF WAR OF 1774, §§ XI, art, I, XIV, art. XVI, reprinted
188

in G. DAVIS, MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 581, 589, 593 (3d rev. ed. 1915)).
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the civil authorities upon application by or on behalf of an injured party.195 According to the Court, scholars have hypothesized that in the absence of an application, the military authorities could prosecute for the same offenses. 196 Furthermore, American military records dating from the period indicate that soldiers were court-martialed for offenses committed against civilians which were
also punishable under civil law.197 In short, the Court in Solorio concluded that
the historical analysis was ambiguous at best and therefore not sufficient to reject the plain language of clause 14.198
Fourth, "[j]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action
under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules
and regulations for their governance is challenged."l 99 This was the principle
followed by a plethora of cases addressing the constitutional rights of servicemen in a plethora of contexts.200
Lastly, the application of the nexus test proved unwieldy. Justice Harlan
predicted the outcome in his O'Callahandissent: "[Tihe infinite permutations of
possibly relevant factors are bound to create confusion and proliferate litigation
over the jurisdictional issue in each instance." 2 0 1 After O'Callahan,the Supreme
Court found it necessary to further elucidate the nexus test in Relford and military courts identified numerous offenses requiring a specialized analysis of the
nexus test in numerous post-O'Callahanand Relford decisions.202 Those cases
highlighted issues concerning the distinctions between offenses which occurred
both on and off-base and offenses committed near a base. 2 03 The nexus test also
Id. at 444 (citing Nelson & Westbrook, Court-MartialJurisdiction over Servicemen for
"Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14 (1969); Duke
& Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-MartialJurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 445-46 (1960)).
195

196

Id.

Id. (citing O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 278 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See also JOSEPH W.
BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 81-82 (1974); John F. DePue,
O'Callahan and Its Progeny: A Survey of Their Impact on the Jurisdictionof Courts-Martial,15
VILL. L. REV. 712, 719 n.38 (1970). Nelson & Westbrook, supranote 196, at 15.
197

198

Solorio, 483 U.S. at 446.

Id. at 447 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508 (1986) (additional citation
199
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
200
Id. at 447-48. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509-510 (1986) (free exercise of religion);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-05 (1983) (racial discrimination); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1981) (sex discrimination); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357, 360 (1980)
(free expression); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976) (right to counsel in summary
court-martial proceedings); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 753 (1975) (availability of
injunctive relief from an impending court-martial); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (due
process rights and freedom of expression).
201
O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 284 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
202
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448-49.
203
Id. at 449. See, e.g., United States v. Garries, 19 M.J. 845 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) (serviceman's
on-post murder of wife held service connected), aff'd, 22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 479
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complicated other jurisdictional issues, such as the status of the victims of
crimes, 204 and proved to be especially confounding in the context of drug offenses.205
In summary, because precedent and original intent supported jurisdiction based on status, because the historical analysis of practices was ambiguous,
because the legislature was due great deference, and because the O'CallahanRelford nexus test proved unwieldy in its application, the Supreme Court in Solorio finally dealt the death blow to the nexus test.
3.

The Nexus Test Reborn

The MSC provides that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is established if a
nexus exists between an offense, either military or non-military, and the state
military force."206 The drafters reasoned that because members of the state military force are under obligation of oath, they fall under the jurisdiction of the
state during a period of service twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week,
"regardless of duty status."207 In support of this reasoning, the drafters cited
Solorio and went on to explain:
U.S. 985 (1986); United States v. Williamson, 19 M.J. 617 (A.C.M.R. 1984) (serviceman's offpost sexual offense involving young girl held service connected); United States v. Mauck, 17 M.J.
1033 (A.C.M.R. 1984) (variety of offenses committed fifteen feet from arsenal boundary held
service connected), review denied, 19 M.J. 106 (C.M.A. 1984); United States v. Scott, 15 M.J. 589
(A.C.M.R. 1983) (serviceman's off-post murder of another servicemen held service connected
where crime had its basis in on-post conduct of participants).
204
Solorio, 483 U.S. at 449. Cf United States v. Wilson, 2 M.J. 24 (C.M.A. 1976) (off-post
robbery and assault of a fellow servicemen held not service connected) and United States v. Tucker, 1 M.J. 463 (C.M.A. 1976) (off-post concealment of property stolen from fellow serviceman
on-post held not service connected) with United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. I (C.M.A. 1983)
(on-post larceny of fellow serviceman's wallet and use of identification cards in it to obtain loan
from an off-post business establishment held service connected) and United States v. Shorte, 18
M.J. 518 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984) (off-post felonious assault committed against fellow serviceman held
not service connected).
205
After O'Callahan, in United States v. Beeker, the Court of Military Appeals held that because drug offenses had "special military significance" their trial by court-martial was unaffected
by the decision in O'Callahan. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 565 (1969). Seven years after Beeker, the
Court of Military Appeals reversed its position, holding that O'Callahan and Relford prevented
off-base drug offenses from being subject to courts-martial. United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26
(C.M.A. 1976). It only took four more years for the court to come full circle by reversing its position once again. United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 340-51 (C.M.A. 1980). The Trottier court
reasoned that the gravity of drug abuse on military operations almost necessarily made them service connected, but Trottier created an exception to its own rule for "unusual circumstances,"
including a service member "on a lengthy period of leave away" from their military post. Id at
350 n.28. The result was only further confusion. See United States v. Lange, 11 M.J. 884
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during 6-day leave held sufficient to establish service connection); United States v. Brace, 11 M.J. 794 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (off-post use of marijuana during 6-day leave 275 miles from post held sufficient to establish service connection).
206
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 2(b).
207
Id. at ann. to art. 2.
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Subject matter jurisdiction is established by nexus and can occur in the following four situations: (1) The military offenses in
this code apply when members of the state military forces are in
a duty status; (2) Non-military offenses may apply to state military forces in a duty status if a nexus exists between the nonmilitary offense and the state military force; (3) The military offenses in this code apply when members of the state military
forces are in a non- duty status if a nexus exists between the
military offense and the state military forces and; (4) Nonmilitary offenses may apply to state military forces in a nonduty status if a nexus exists between the non-military offense
and the state military forces. . . . Moreover, non-military of-

fenses may apply to state military forces in a non-duty status if
a nexus exists between the civilian offense and the state military
forces.208
Hence, to say what the plain language of the MSC's annotation on jurisdiction is would be to state an oxymoron. Moreover, relying on Solorio is
peculiar at best. Solorio stood for the proposition-more aptly the return to the
proposition-that persons are subject to the military justice system if those persons are members of the military. The drafters of the MSC unnecessarily replaced the straightforward and predictable rule from Solorio with the confounding nexus test from O'Callahanand Relford.
One explanation is that some commentators are uncomfortable with the
near-blanket grant of subject matter jurisdiction that the status test provides. 209
The criticisms range from the status test rendering unavailable "procedural safeguards that are germane to notions of liberty" 2 10 to the possibility of the status
test functionally resulting in volunteering for the death penalty. 211 Thus, critics
of the status test argue that it represents the worst of a draconian military justice
system. In this view, the MSC and WVUSCMJ's adoption of the nexus test
represent a liberalization of the military justice system. Nonetheless, whether or
not the adoption of the nexus test was principled, history indicates that it will
prove to be just as impractical today as it was before.

208

Id.
Michael P. Connors, Note, The Demise of the Service-Connection Test: Solorio v. United
States, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1145 (1988). See also Captain Patrick J. Cunningham, Review of
Courts-Martialby the Supreme Court of the United States-Miles to Go Before We Sleep, ARMY
LAW., Dec. 1988 at 18, 18 (noting that even the Solorio court "declined to provide a ringing endorsement of the fair-mindedness of the military justice system").
210
Connors, supra note 209, at 1146-47.
211 See Meredith L. Robinson, Comment, Volunteers for the Death Penalty? The Application of
Solorio v. United States to Military CapitalLitigation,6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1049 (1998).
209
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Right to Appellate Review

C.

As it stands, the UCMJ provides soldiers with a right to appellate review when sentenced to death, dismissal (for commissioned officers, cadets, or
midshipmen only), "dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for
one year or more."212 The Commission on Military Justice ("Commission") has
called the automatic appeal provisions of the UCMJ a "celebrated keystone of
U.S. military justice" and indicative of "the UCMJ's long-standing commitment
to providing convicted servicemembers appropriate avenues of appeal and re-

lief."213
Nevertheless, the Commission's top recommendation in 2009 was for
the UCMJ to be amended so that a right to appellate review exists whenever a
"servicemember is convicted at a general or special court-martial after a plea of
not guilty and that conviction is approved by the convening authority."2 14 The
reasons for the Commission's recommendation were several.
First, the right to appellate review is "unlikely to increase substantially
the workload of appellate courts." 2 15 Second, the right to appellate review would
eliminate the perception-and occasional reality-"that some court-martial
convictions cannot be reviewed even when errors of law exist." 2 16 Third, civilian jurisdictions often provide for review of misdemeanor convictions because
the impact on a defendant's life can still be devastating. 2 17 The consequences for
a servicemember convicted of a general or special court-martial are even greater, for the servicemember risks "termination of employment, harm to reputation,
and loss of liberty"-plus the loss of military status and accompanying military
benefits.218
In comparison, the MSC does not provide an automatic appellate review
of court-martial convictions.2 19 While there is no death penalty under the MSC,
a servicemember can still be sentenced to up to ten years imprisonment. 2 20 Thus,
where the UCMJ provides automatic appellate review for any sentence over one
212

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (2006).

213

REPORT

214

Id

215

Id.

216

Id

JUSTICE 6 (2009), available at
on "Report" under the heading
(click
http://www.wcl.american.edulnimj/cox_commission.cfm
"Second Cox Commission Report: Report of the Commission on Military Justice, October 2009)
[hereinafter COMMISSION ON MILITARY JUSTICE]. The Commission is sponsored by the National
Institute of Military Justice and the Military Justice Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of
the American Bar Association.
OF

THE

COMMISSION

ON

MILITARY

217

Id.
Id. at 7. Examples of benefits that may be lost are: education, military pension, and lifelong
healthcare.
219
MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 67(a).
220
Id. art. 56.
218
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year, the MSC does not provide automatic appellate review for any sentence up
to and including its ten year maximum.
The drafters of the MSC also declined to establish specific appellate
procedures. "[A] state must determine whether it chooses to process an appeal
by the accused through its criminal appellate courts or directly to the state's
highest court."221 Given the variation in appellate court systems among states,
this may have been nothing more than practical politics. But the drafters did go
as far as to recommend that states rely on their highest court to act as the appellate authority due to procedural differences between courts-martial and civilian
criminal trials.222 The drafters further reasoned that because the number of appealed courts-martial is likely to be small, there would be no ill effect to appealing directly to states' highest courts, but it would have the positive effect of
leading to consistent and uniform case law.223
The result is curious. The UCMJ affords service members a greater opportunity for automatic appellate review, yet some feel the UCMJ still does not
go far enough. Why the MSC would provide no automatic appellate review is
bewildering. Consider the reasoning: because there will be a small number of
appealed courts-martial, states should choose their highest court to act as appellate authority. If the number of appeals is insubstantial, why not require automatic appellate reviews for all general and special courts-martial?
The absence of an automatic appellate review is curious for at least two
other reasons. First, the MSC was progressive in declining to include the death
penalty despite modeling the UCMJ. Arguably, this may also have been practical politics as an increasing number of states do not have the death penalty, use it
infrequently, or do not use it at all. 2 24 Because forty-nine states have mandatory
review of some types of cases,225 it would have been practical politics for the
MSC to at least include the same level of mandatory review as the UCMJ.
Second, one of the main reasons the Commission recommended that automatic review be extended under the UCMJ was to combat the negative perception of the military justice system.226 In this instance, the drafters of the MSC
should have taken the opportunity to be logical, practical, and progressive in
designing a new military justice system.

221
222
223

224

Id., at ann. to art. 56.
Id
Id
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2010: YEAR END REPORT,

(2010), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/20 10YearEnd-Final.pdf.
225
Linnsey Evick, Note, A Door Closed: The Right to Full Appellate Review of Sentences of
Life Imprisonment Without Parole in West Virginia, 112 W. VA. L. REv. 241 (2009).
226
COMMISSION ON MILITARY JUSTICE, supranote 213.
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West Virginia's adopted version of the MSC designates the state's
highest court as having appellate review consistent with its procedures for the
appeal of criminal cases.227
Ironically, up until December 1, 2010, West Virginia was the lone state
with only discretionary review.22 8 Before then, West Virginia had no guaranteed
right of appellate review in its civil courts, 22 9 and West Virginia did not and still
does not have an intermediate appellate court. 230
The lack of a right to appellate review was one reason the American
Tort Reform Association (ATRA) had consistently ranked West Virginia at or
near the top of its annual "Judicial Hellholes" report.23 1 While some commentators have accused the ATRA of being nothing more than 'a front group for big
money corporate special interests,"' 2 32 then-Governor Joe Manchin formed the
Independent Commission on Judicial Reform in 2009,233 with retired Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor serving as honorary chair.2 34

Compare MODEL STATE CODE, supra note 66, art. 67(a) ("Decisions of a court-martial are
from a court with jurisdiction to issue felony convictions and appeals are to the court provided by
the law of the state in which the court-martial was held. The appellate procedures to be followed
shall be those provided by law for the appeal of criminal cases thereto."), with W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-1E-67a (LexisNexis 2011) ("Decisions of a court-martial are from a court with jurisdiction to
issue felony convictions and appeals are to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The
appellate procedures to be followed shall be those provided by law for the appeal of criminal cases
thereto.").
228
Evick, supra note 225, at 253.
229
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; Evick, supra note 225, at 253-54 (noting that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has interpreted the West Virginia Constitution to mean that the
court's appellate review in criminal and civil cases is discretionary).
230
WEST VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM, available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/JudSys.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
231
Michael Hupp, West Virginia Third in Judicial Hellhole Rankings, THE STATE J., Dec. 16,
2010, availableat http://statejournal.com/story.cfm?storyid=91137&func-viewstory.
232
Id
233
To be fair, the ATRA's report was probably only a factor in Manchin's formation of the
Commission. The reality was that, in 2008, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused
to exercise its discretionary review over two of the five largest jury verdicts in the nation. See
Supreme Court Will Not Hear Massey, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Case, THE STATE J., Dec. 1,
2008, availableat http://statejoumal.comstory.cfm?func-viewstory&storyid-47721 (circuit court
awarded $220 million in Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Central West Virginia Energy Co.,
No. 05-C-85 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1997); Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC., 2007 WL 5539870
(Cir. Ct. W. Va. 2007); Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC., 2007 WL 5539871 (Cir. Ct. W.
Va. 2007), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 1186 (2008) (awarding a verdict of $405 million).
234
Press Release, West Virginia University, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
attends hearing at WVU College of Law (September 18, 2009), available at
http://wvutoday.wvu.edu/n/2009/9/18/supreme-court-justice-sandra-day-o-connor-to-attendhearing-at-wvu-college-of-law.
227
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The Commission ultimately recommended that West Virginia establish
an intermediate court of appeals. 2 35 But the end result was that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals revised its rules so that every appeal receives either a full opinion or a "memorandum decision."236 The latter are abbreviated
and unpublished opinions, 2 37 but are meant to guarantee a review of all cases
and transparency as to the court's reasoning.238 Nevertheless, not everyone has
been satisfied with the outcome, 239 and the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals opposed the legislative effort to create an intermediate court. 240 While
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has called the revised rules "an
critics have called
appeal of right instead of an appeal by permission,"241 other
242
the result a "'rubber stamp of most lower court rulings."'
While the question of whether the West Virginia Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure amount to a substantial right of appeal sufficient to save Pri235

WEST VIRGINIA INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT:
NOVEMBER

15, 2009, 32 (Nov. 15, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22604435/West-VirginiaIndependent-Commission-on-Judicial-Reform-Final-Report. The Commission's Final Report is
not available on its website, www.judicialreform.wv.gov. In fact, the website appears to have been
taken down.
236

W.

238

Chris Dickerson, Revised Rules Drawing Mixed Reviews, THE WEST VIRGINIA RECORD, Oct.

VA.
REVISED
R.
APP.
P.
21-22,
available
at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/Rules/appellate-revisions/Revised-Rules-of-Appellate-ProcedureFINAL.pdf.
237
Id. While the memorandum opinions are abbreviated and unpublished, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has changed the policy with regards to memorandum opinions:
The prohibition on citing memorandum decisions was removed. Memorandum decisions may be cited. They will be posted on the Court's website and
therefore will be available for review and to provide guidance to other courts
on West Virginia law. Where practicable, in cases in which a circuit court decision is affirmed by a memorandum decision, that circuit court decision also
will be posted on the website, if the Court so directs.
Press Release, Supreme Court of Appeals State of West Virginia, Supreme Court Issues Final
Version of Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure (Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/press/octl9 10.htm.

22, 2010, available at http://www.wvrecord.com/news/230642-revised-rules-drawing-mixedreviews.
239

Id

Hoppy Kercheval, Their View: State Supreme Court Promises Better Appeals Process, THE
W. VA. REC., Feb. 12, 2010, available at http://www.wvrecord.com/news/224731-their-viewstate-supreme-court-promises-better-appeals-process; W. Henry Jernigan Jr. & Jill Cranston
Bentz, West Virginia Needs Substantive Right ofAppeal, THE NAT'L L. REV., Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/west-virginia-needs-substantive-right-appeal.
It
should be noted that the lead author of this article was also defense counsel for Massey Energy,
the parent company of Central West Virginia Energy Co. in the Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.
See generally Order at 1, Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Central West Virginia Energy Co.,
No. 05-C-85, 2007 WL 4913174 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2007).
241
Press Release, supra note 237.
242
Id.
240
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vate Snuffy remains an open question, it appears that West Virginia courtsmartial will receive a review from the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
The word "appears" is used for two reasons. Consider the following facts:
(1) the WVUSCMJ provides for appellate review consistent
with the procedures for the appeal of criminal cases, 2 4 3
(2) the West Virginia Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to civil and criminal cases as set forth in West Virginia
Code Section 58-5-1(minus certain enumerated exceptions), 24
and
(3) West Virginia Code section 58-5-1 allows the defendant in a
criminal action to appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court. 245
The first issue is that the WVUSCMJ refers to the Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure which in turn refer to West Virginia Code section 58-5-1. Section 58-5-1 applies only to the final judgment of circuit courts, not courtsmartial. However, this inconsistency can and should be recognized for what it
is: poor drafting. If the WVUSCMJ intends for the rules to govern, and the rules
intend to create an appeal of right for criminal convictions, then it seems clear
that the intent would be for court-martial convictions to have an appeal of right.
The second issue is that the WVUSCMJ refers to the rules of procedure
for criminal cases. As discussed supra this Note, Section V, Part A(l), summary
courts-martial have been considered non-criminal proceedings. Yet, the
WVUSCMJ also states that "[d]ecisions of a court-martial are from a court with
jurisdiction to issue felony convictions and appeals are to the West Virginia
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-1E-67a (LexisNexis 2011). ("Decisions of a court-martial are from
a court with jurisdiction to issue felony convictions and appeals are to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. The appellate procedures to be followed shall be those provided by law for the
appeal of criminal cases thereto.") Id.
244
W. VA. REVISED R. App. P. 5, supra note 236 ("This rule governs all appeals from a circuit
court final judgment or other appealable order in a civil or criminal case as set forth in West Virginia Code § 58-5-1, except .... ) Id.
245
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-1 (LexisNexis 2011).
A party to a civil action may appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals from a
final judgment of any circuit court or from an order of any circuit court constituting a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties
upon an express determination by the circuit court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment as to such
claims or parties. The defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court in which
there has been a conviction or which affirms a conviction obtained in an infenor court.
243

Id.
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Supreme Court of Appeals."246 Thus, it appears that the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals could hold that summary courts-martial have an appeal of
right because the language of the statute governs: a summary court-martial is a
court-martial, and a court-martial is appealed to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. However, the probability is that this too was the result of poor
drafting. For reasons also discussed supra, there is a strong argument that summary courts-martial are rightly considered administrative discipline (hence, noncriminal) and case law should govern.
The issues highlight that the MSC's exclusion of automatic appellate
review was unfortunate, particularly in light of current trends both among the
states and within the UCMJ. Moreover, the WVUSCMJ could have avoided
ambiguity by explicitly providing a right of appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for all special and general courts-martial. One can only
hope that states choose to adopt a right of automatic review for the service
members who defend the rights that we enjoy.

VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the arguments of the naysayers, the purpose of the MSC was
to harmonize the fifty-four codes of military justice that were in existence to
something approximating a smaller number. There is no denying the MSC
achieves that purpose.
Nevertheless, for those states whose codes were already substantially
based on the UCMJ, the MSC will not represent a particularly great deal of
change or improvement. However, that should not be enough to keep states
from adopting the MSC-much of its value is precisely in the sum of its whole
(uniformity), not the sum of any individual part.
Strangely, the MSC on one hand partially removed the right to demand
a court-martial (an anti-progressive decision) but on the other hand adopted a
nexus test that had been tried for a short time and rejected (but a liberalization
nonetheless). This Note has argued, and maintains, that removal of the right to
demand a court-martial should not be necessary if the MSC fulfills its other objectives. Nevertheless, limiting the right to demand a court-martial stands on
solid legal ground. Regardless of whether the limitation proves to have been
necessary, it will allow National Guard commanders to utilize NJPs for the first
time.
Second, the O'Callahannexus test was put to rest for good reason: it
simply did not work in the real world. It did not work then, and this Note maintains that the same scenarios, for the same reasons, will still befall it now. The
test of military status alone has been legally sufficient for all of this country's
history except the eighteen years between O'Callahan and Solorio. Status

246

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 15-1E-67a (LexisNexis 2011).
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represents a clear bright-line rule. Without any evidence that the status test actually resulted in injustices, it should have been left alone.
Third, the MSC should have been forward-looking by adopting a right
to appellate review. The movement among states and in the UCMJ is to provide
automatic appellate review. Given the rights which soldiers fight for, and the
unique circumstances military service places them in, National Guardsmen
should be afforded mandatory review of court-martial convictions.
Lastly, despite whatever powers the MSC provides, adjudication and litigation still take substantial resources in terms of time, money, and burden. In
days of tightening defense budgets, it appears doubtful that the National Guards
will desire to move any civil case to the court-martial setting. In that scenario,
National Guard courts-martial may still be few and far between, leaving uniformity and the ability to NJP as the MSC's greatest accomplishments. Nevertheless, those achievements, coupled with the recommendations herein, make a
strong case for states to adopt the MSC.
JaredJ.Jones*
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